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INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday July 27, 1999 Germany’s Minister of Economics Werner Mueller an-
nounced that between 1997 and 1998 foreign direct investment ﬂ  ows (FDI) in Germany 
doubled to around 35 billion marks. He also suggested that, “Reforms on corporate tax 
and nonwage labor costs will further improve (Germany’s) position as a market place.”1 
On a similar tone, Ludovit Cernak, the Slovak Minister of Economics announced in 
early September of 1999 that by the end of the same year $220 million of FDI was 
expected to ﬂ  ow into the country. He also mentioned that the government was drafting 
a new law on taxation that was intended to increase support to FDI inﬂ  ows.2
In the late 90s, tax incentives, as part of a package to attract FDI inﬂ  ows, became 
a common practice among several Eastern European countries. In 1996 Poland at-
tracted General Motor’s Adam Opel AG unit to build its $300 million plant in south 
Katowice by offering free infrastructure and a 10-year tax holiday. At the same time, 
the Hungarian government approved legislation that lengthened the time of tax 
holidays offered to foreign investors (from 5 to 10 years). Finally, the Czech govern-
ment offered tax incentives to Intel in luring the company to build its chip-assembly 
plant in the Czech Republic. Economic-development experts argue that for Eastern 
European countries, tax and other incentives have become increasingly important 
in attracting FDI inﬂ  ows as labor and other costs move closer to Western levels.3 
Overall, business practice indicates that tax incentives represent a key factor in at-
tracting FDI inﬂ  ows. 
Tax incentives also seem to inﬂ  uence companies’ decisions about the ownership 
structure of their foreign subsidiaries. The Wall Street Journal Europe reported that 
Ramco Oil & Gas PLC intended to develop an oil ﬁ  eld in Azerbaijan pending on a 
change in its share of property of its joint venture with Socar, Azerbaijan’s state oil 
company. Ramco was waiting for governmental approval to convert its joint venture 
with Socar to a production-sharing contract, with Ramco owning a larger share of the 
subsidiary and thus receive a more favorable tax treatment. Mr. Bertram, Ramco’s 
Chief Financial Ofﬁ  cer, stated that “once we’ve been given full approval, we will start 
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Motivated by such anecdotal evidence, this study investigates empirically the im-
pact of a host country’s taxation on FDI inﬂ  ows. We thus present evidence that taxation 
has an important effect on aggregate FDI ﬂ  ows, but various types of taxes inﬂ  uence 
differently the FDI ﬂ  ows to majority owned subsidiaries (MOS) and minority owned 
subsidiaries (MIS). Speciﬁ  cally, corporate income, capital gains and dividends tax 
rates inﬂ  uence the aggregate ﬂ  ows of FDI, with the ﬁ  rst having the strongest impact 
among the three. Also, corporate income and capital gains taxes have a strong effect 
on FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS with the taxation on dividends having a much smaller impact. 
However, FDI ﬂ  ows to minority owned subsidiaries (MIS) seem to respond very little 
to lower taxes in the host country. Finally, these differences in the tax responsiveness 
of different types of FDI are statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous research has focused extensively on the relationship between taxation 
and FDI ﬂ  ows presenting evidence for a rather small relationship. Hartman [1985] 
ﬁ  nds a positive but small relationship between U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows and the after-tax 
rate of return in host countries, while Boskin and Gale [1987], and Newlon [1987] 
extended Hartman’s study and found similar results over a longer period of time. 
Grubert and Mutti [1991] and Hines and Rice [1994] ﬁ  nd a larger tax elasticity of 
U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows that ranges between 1.5 and 3. Cummins and Hubbard [1995], us-
ing micro data from U.S. foreign subsidiaries, ﬁ  nd that tax parameters do inﬂ  uence 
U.S. outﬂ  ows of FDI. Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon [2001] present evidence that 
the elasticity of real U.S. capital outﬂ  ows and the after-tax rates of return was 1.5 
in 1984 but rose to almost 3.0 in 1992, claiming that the FDI outﬂ  ows became more 
sensitive to taxes in the recent years. Finally, Swenson [1997] indicates that various 
types of U.S. FDI inﬂ  ows respond differently to taxes. 
Cassou [1997] on the other hand contributes in the literature by studying the 
relationship between two types of taxes, corporate and individual income taxes, with 
FDI ﬂ  ows. He ﬁ  nds that the individual income tax rate has similar effects on FDI 
as the corporate tax rate. The explanation for this effect is not clear since individual 
income taxes do not directly reduce the returns of FDI investments in foreign markets 
made by multinational corporations.
Our approach also includes multiple types of taxes, which, at least theoretically, 
are expected to affect the returns a multinational corporation receives from its foreign 
subsidiaries. Speciﬁ  cally, we consider taxes on corporate income, capital gains and 
withholding dividends that inﬂ  uence respectively a multinational’s ordinary (non-
capital) corporate income, capital income and the income transferred back to the home 
country (repatriated income). Thus, the taxes in consideration have a direct impact 
on the returns a multinational receives from its FDI activity. 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION
Investors, in an attempt to maximize after tax returns from their investment, 
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gains will be affected by taxes. To simply illustrate the point, suppose an investor 
considers two investments of equal risk, the ﬁ  rst with a 10 percent rate of return and 
a tax rate of 40 percent, and the second with an 8 percent rate of return and a tax rate 
of 12.5 percent. Obviously, the investor will choose the second investment, although of 
a lower pre-tax rate of return, since the after-tax return of this investment is greater 
than the alternative one ([10%*(1-0.4)=6%], versus [8%*(1-0.125)=7%]). 
In an international investment environment, there are a variety of taxes that might 
apply to any particular investment by a multinational corporation. Corporate and 
individual income taxes, capital gains taxes, taxes on withholding dividends, interest 
and royalties, property taxes, and import and export duties are only few examples.
However, different taxes might have a varying impact on FDI ﬂ  ows due to the 
speciﬁ  c ownership structure of the foreign subsidiary. For instance, the host country’s 
corporate income tax rate will generally apply to the entire income of a MOS, but only to 
a portion of the income generated from a MIS. This occurs in host countries where their 
tax burden is imposed on the investors of a MIS rather than the MIS itself. Therefore 
we might expect a weaker tax responsiveness of FDI to MIS than to MOS.
On the other hand, a home country’s tax system might treat differently income 
that comes from MOS versus MIS. For instance, Desai and Hines [1999] point out 
that U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows to MIS dropped signiﬁ  cantly after 1986 because the 1986 U.S. 
Tax Reform Act (TRA) introduced a more complex method for U.S. multinationals in 
ﬁ  ling foreign tax credits for income from foreign MIS. 
Similarly, dividend withholding taxes do not inﬂ  uence the return from an FDI 
uniformly. This tax is imposed on the transfer of dividends (repatriated proﬁ  ts) from 
a foreign subsidiary to its parent company. Thus, its impact depends, in part, on the 
length of the time interval between the generation of the proﬁ  ts and their repatria-
tion. If there is a great delay from the time the proﬁ  ts are generated to the time the 
proﬁ  ts are repatriated, the withholding tax will have less impact due to the time value 
of money. In fact, the withholding tax should have little or no impact if the foreign 
investor intends to either permanently, or for an extended period of time, leave the 
proﬁ  ts in the host country. 
Finally, the capital gains tax applies to limited types of economic transactions 
varying among jurisdictions. Generally, it applies to transactions that are not part of 
the ordinary course of business, and therefore, will not apply to the sale of inventory 
or ordinary services rendered. Instead, it applies to infrequent transactions such as 
the sale of a building or machinery (so long as the building and machinery are not 
inventory). Since the tax is not imposed on the normal or mainstream generation of 
income, it should have less of an impact on FDI than the corporate income tax.
Ultimately, taxes have an important impact on other activities, besides FDI, 
by multinational corporations. The latter, in an effort to reduce their tax liabilities, 
structure and ﬁ  nance their investments appropriately, or relocate taxable income, 
through transfer pricing, from subsidiaries located in relatively high tax countries 
towards subsidiaries in relatively low tax countries (see, for instance, Grubert and 
Mutti [1991] or Grubert [1998]). However, in this paper, we only focus on the effects 
of various tax rates on the ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries.688 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
DATA 
 
In testing empirically the intuition developed in the previous section we use data 
on U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows maintained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. The database contains information on the economic activities 
of 2,272 U.S. Multinational Corporations with 18,899 foreign subsidiaries worldwide, 
for the period between 1983 and 1993. These are annual data for all the above foreign 
subsidiaries, organized by the host country in which these subsidiaries are located, and 
the industry (2-digit SIC) in which their primary products belong. In our sample, we 
include U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows to fourteen countries (eight from Europe, two from North 
and South America, three for Asia, and Australia) and in ten 2-digit SIC industries. 
We also employ three types of taxes – the corporate income tax, the capital gains 
tax and ﬁ  nally the dividend withholding tax – in each of the host countries in our 
sample. Data on these taxes (from 1986 to 1993) come from the Coopers & Lybrand 
Annual International Tax summaries, while from 1983 to 1985 the tax data come 
from the Foreign Tax and Trade Briefs. The dividends withholding tax rates were 
further adjusted to reﬂ  ect any tax treaty rates in effect. The tax treaty information 
was obtained from the Bureau of National Affairs Tax Treaty Service.5 
TAXES AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the key variables in the analysis indicat-
ing a negative correlation between a host country’s corporate tax rate and its total 
FDI (the sum of FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS and MIS) and MOS inﬂ  ows, but a weak correla-
tion with its FDI inﬂ  ows to MIS. Similarly, host countries’ capital gains tax rates are 
negatively correlated with their total FDI and MOS inﬂ  ows but positively correlated 
with their FDI inﬂ  ows to MIS. Finally, the dividends tax rate is negatively correlated 
with all the three types of FDI ﬂ  ows in our sample. 
On the other hand, the host country’s growth rate of real GDP and the level of 
domestic (U.S.) ﬁ  xed capital investment are positively correlated with all three types 
of U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows in the sample. 
 Host Country’s Taxes and Total FDI Flows
In our estimations we use three different types of tax rates in the host country; 
the corporate tax rate, (COTAXit) , the capital gains tax rate (CATAXit) and the tax 
rate on dividends (DITAXit).6 Since we use panel data, Ordinary Least Squares, the 
Fixed Effects model and the Random Effects model are used in estimations. Notice 
that the ﬁ  rst model estimates a single intercept for the entire data pooled together, 
while the second model estimates a separate intercept for each country in the sample 
assuming that unknown country-speciﬁ  c differences might be shifting the estimated 
lines. However, some researchers claim that this ignorance should be treated like the 
one that is captured by the regular error term of the estimated equation, and thus 
propose the Random Effects model, which calculates an additional error term that 
picks any shift of the regression line that is observation speciﬁ  c. We ﬁ  nally report the 
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(that tests between the OLS and the Fixed/Random Effects model) and the Hausman 
statistic (that tests between the Fixed and the Random Effects model). Finally, reduced 
form equation (1) is estimated and the results are reported in Table 3. 
(1)  ( ) FDI f VE GDP I TAX ijt it it jt it = ,, ,      
 
where (FDIijt) is the real total U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows, and also the U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows to 
MOS and MIS in the host countries of our sample (in country i, industry j and year 
t), (VEit) is the volatility of the bilateral real exchange rate between the U.S. dollar 
and the host country’s currency, (GDPit) is the real GDP growth of the host country, 
(Ijt) is the real investment on ﬁ  xed capital in the U.S., and ﬁ  nally (TAXit) is the tax 
rate in the host country (i.e., one of the three tax rates in our data). 
The corporate tax rate in the host country has a strong, negative and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant impact on FDI ﬂ  ows. Ceteris paribus, and consistent with Grubert and Mutti 
[1991] and Hines and Rice [1994], a 1 percent increase in the host country’s corporate 
tax rate (COTAXit) causes a 3.10 percent drop in the U.S. total FDI outﬂ  ows to the 
same country. Also, ceteris paribus, the host country’s growth rate of real (GDPit) , 
and the level of U.S. investment on ﬁ  xed capital (Ijt) have a positive and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant impact on the U.S. total FDI outﬂ  ows to the host country. Finally, the 
volatility of the U.S. dollar (VOLit) with respect to the host country’s currency (that 
captures the host country’s economic risk) appears to deter U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows (con-
sistent with Campa [1993] and others). 
Similarly, the host country’s capital gains tax rate (CATAXit) has a negative impact 
on total FDI inﬂ  ows from the U.S. A 1 percent increase in (CATAXit) is associated with 
2.15 percent decline in total FDI inﬂ  ows from the U.S. Finally, the host country’s tax 
rate on dividends (DITAXit) has a similar but much smaller impact on total FDI inﬂ  ows 
from the U.S. A 1 percent increase in it is associated with a drop of 0.26 percent in 
total FDI inﬂ  ows from the U.S. Overall, all three types of tax rates have the expected 
impact on FDI ﬂ  ows in the host countries. However, the corporate income tax rate 
among the tree appears to have the strongest effects on FDI ﬂ  ows. 
 Multiple Taxation and Total FDI Flows
So far, it appears that host country’s tax rates have a strong and statistically sig-
niﬁ  cant impact on FDI ﬂ  ows. However, managers consider various taxes concurrently 
when they make their FDI decisions. Taxation on corporate income along with taxation 
on capital gains and dividends are important elements in their decision, since these 
taxes affect different aspects of the company’s economic activities in the host country. 
At the same time, there is a fairly strong and positive correlation at least between 
the level of the corporate tax rate and the capital gains tax rate (Table 2). Countries 
that have high (low) corporate tax rates also tend to have high (low) capital gains tax 
rates. On the other hand, the dividends tax rate is much less correlated with either 
the corporate tax rates or the capital gains rates. 
In this section, we extend our analysis by measuring the marginal impact of a 
given tax rate on the tax responsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows to another tax rate. For that, 
equation (2) is estimated, and the results are reported in Table 6. 690 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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where (TAX1it) is one type of host country’s tax rate and (TAX2it) is a second (differ-
ent) type of host country’s tax rate. 
The estimated coefﬁ  cient of (TAX1it * TAX2it ) captures the marginal effect of a 
certain taxation on the tax responsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows to another taxation. The im-
pact of the corporate tax rate on total U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows becomes stronger (i.e., more 
negative) as the tax rates on capital gains and dividends increase (negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁ  cant coefﬁ  cient of the interaction variable between the corporate and 
the capital gains tax rate (COCAit) and also the corporate and the dividends tax rate 
(CODIit) respectively). Similarly, the impact of the capital gains taxation on total FDI 
ﬂ  ows becomes stronger as the corporate or the dividend tax rate increases. Finally, the 
impact of the dividends tax on total FDI ﬂ  ows becomes stronger only when the capital 
gains tax rate increases. Overall, the tax responsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows becomes stronger 
when other taxes are taken in to consideration. Apparently, companies consider more 
than one tax in the host country when they decide on their FDI ﬂ  ows. 
Host Country’s Taxes and FDI Flows to MOS
In the next two sections, we decompose the volume of aggregate U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows 
to those that ﬂ  ow in to MOS and MIS. First, we estimate the effects of taxation on 
FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS. Equation (1) is estimated again with the dependent variable being 
the FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS. The results are reported in Table 4. 
All three tax rates used in our study have a negative and statistically signiﬁ  cant 
impact on FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS. The strongest effect, magnitude wise, comes from the 
corporate tax rate and the weakest from the dividends tax rate. Speciﬁ  cally, FDI ﬂ  ows to 
MOS drop by 4.22 percent, 3.13 percent and 0.27 percent when the host country’s tax rate 
on corporate income, capital gains and dividends increases respectively by 1 percent. 
On the other hand, the level of U.S. investment on ﬁ  xed capital  (Ijt) has a positive 
and statistically signiﬁ  cant impact on U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows to MOS in all the regressions. 
It appears that U.S. outﬂ  ows of capital do not compete with domestic ﬁ  xed investment 
(see also Goldberg and Kolstad [1995]). Finally, the host country’s GDP growth and 
the exchange rate volatility have the expected impact on MOS outﬂ  ows, but these 
results are not robust across all speciﬁ  cations.
In testing for the interaction effects of different tax rates on U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows 
to MOS, equation (2) is estimated again, with the dependent variable being the U.S. 
FDI outﬂ  ows to MOS. The results are reported in Table 7. Again, in all cases, the 
interaction effects of various tax rates on U.S. FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS are negative and 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
 Host Country’s Taxes and FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS
In this section we study the impact of host countries’ tax rates on the U.S. FDI 
inﬂ  ows to MIS. Again, we estimate equation (1) with the dependent variable being 
the U.S. FDI outﬂ  ows to MIS. The results are reported in Table 5.691 TAXATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN FOREIGN MARKETS
Overall, the tax responsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS is much weaker than in the 
case of FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS. Indeed, the estimated tax elasticities drop by approximately 
50 percent in the case of corporate income taxes and dividend taxes and more than 
that in the case of capital gains taxes. On the other hand, in all speciﬁ  cations the host 
country’s GDP growth and the level of U.S. domestic investment on ﬁ  xed capital have 
a strong, positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant effect on FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS. 
In terms of the interaction effects of various tax rates on FDI to MIS, we estimate 
again equation (2) (Table 8). Overall, with only one exception, the interaction effects 
of various taxes on FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS are not statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
Apparently, taxation in the host country has, at best, mixed effects on FDI ﬂ  ows 
to MIS, while it strongly inﬂ  uences FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS. To test whether these differ-
ences in tax responsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS and MIS are statistically signiﬁ  cant, 
reduced form equation (3) is estimated and the results are reported in Table 9.
(3)  ( ) FDI f D VE GDP I TAX D TAX ijt MIS it it jt it MIS it = ,, , , , *   
Now, both the FDI to MOS and MIS are polled together and the dummy variable   
(DMIS) takes the value of 1 (0) in case of an FDI to MIS (MOS). Then, an interaction 
variable between (TAXit) and (DMIS) is introduced in equation (3) with its coefﬁ  cient 
indicating the difference in the tax responsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows between MIS and 
MOS.
The estimated coefﬁ  cients indicate again the strong and statistically signiﬁ  cant 
impact of all three tax rates on FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS and also the fact that the tax re-
sponsiveness of FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS is much weaker and this difference is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant (since the estimated coefﬁ  cient of the interaction variable (DMIS *TAXit) is 
positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant). Consequently, our basic ﬁ  nding that the tax respon-
siveness of FDI to MIS is much weaker than the one of FDI to MOS is quite robust.
 
Discussion 
Our empirical results indicate that U.S. FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS respond much more 
to host country’s tax incentives than U.S. FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS. This is perhaps due to 
the fact that the U.S. tax system allows U.S. multinationals to receive a tax credit 
for the taxes they pay in the foreign country on their proﬁ  t generated by their major-
ity-owned subsidiaries, but it does not allow them to do so in case of minority-owned 
foreign subsidiaries. At the same time Desai and Hines [1999] suggest that the U.S. 
Tax Reform Act (1986) further complicated the tax liabilities for U.S. multinationals 
with foreign MIS, causing ﬁ  nally a signiﬁ  cant decline in U.S. FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS after 
1986.
On the other hand, host countries tend to offer much stronger tax incentives to 
FDI inﬂ  ows for MOS as opposed to MIS, since the former appear more stable and 
beneﬁ  cial for the local economy than the latter. For instance, in 1998, the government 
authorities in Shanghai, China, announced a wide range of tax incentives to foreign 
companies that were willing to establish wholly-owned R&D facilities in Shanghai.7 
However, the tax incentives were much weaker in case of minority-owned (by the 
foreign company) R& D facilities. 8 692 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Following a similar strategy with China, the government in South Korea was 
planning to offer a tax incentives package in attracting FDI inﬂ  ows, starting at the 
beginning of 1999. 9 These tax incentives were to be available only to foreign com-
panies that were planning in establishing majority-owned subsidiaries, whereas, 
foreign companies could not claim these tax incentives in the case of minority-owned 
subsidiaries, supporting thus our empirical ﬁ  ndings in this study.10 
  
CONCLUSIONS
Taxation overall appears to have catalytic effects on total FDI ﬂ  ows and FDI ﬂ  ows 
to MOS, but much weaker effects on FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS. All three types of taxes used 
in the present study show a strong interactive effect on total FDI ﬂ  ows as well as on 
FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS in the presence of other tax rates, but very little interactive effect 
on FDI ﬂ  ows to MIS. Finally, the corporate tax rate has the strongest impact on total 
FDI and FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS, with the capital gains tax rate in the middle, and the 
dividends tax rate having the weakest overall effect.
Of course, tax incentives might seem effective in attracting at least some types 
of FDI inﬂ  ows, but it must not go unnoticed the growing concern among economists 
and policy makers about the plausible detrimental effects FDI outﬂ  ows might have 
on home countries. Tanzi [2000] for instance argues that the outﬂ  ow of FDI from 
developed countries might erode future tax revenues jeopardizing welfare policies 
in these countries, while Gropp and Kostial [2000] present strong evidence that FDI 
outﬂ  ows diminish home country’s corporate tax base. Although an important topic, 
this is beyond the scope of the present study. 
 Finally, the fact that taxation seems to play an important role in affecting the 
optimal structure of ownership of a foreign subsidiary sets up an interesting research 
question; that of examining the impact taxation might have on different types of FDI 
ﬂ  ows such as Mergers and Acquisitions and Greenﬁ  eld investments. 
 
 APPENDIX  A 
DATA SOURCES AND TRANSFORMATIONS
Countries in the sample: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
Industries in the sample: Petroleum, Food and Kindered Products, Chemical and 
Allied Products, Primary and Fabricated Metals, Machinery except Electrical, Elec-
trical and Electronic Equipment, Transportation equipment, Other Manufacturing, 
Total including Petroleum, Total of all Excluding Petroleum.
FDI Flows to Minority Owned Subsidiaries (MIS): First we subtract the “Total As-
sets of Majority Owned Afﬁ  liates of US Companies” from the “Total Assets of Afﬁ  liates 
of US Companies” in order to derive the “Total Assets of Minority Owned Afﬁ  liates of 
US Companies”. Then we calculate its difference from two consecutive years and for the 
entire period between 1983 through 1993. Then we derive the real value of MIS, by using 
the appropriate price deﬂ  ator. Finally, we normalize the MIS value by dividing it by the 
appropriate real GDP of the host country (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis).693 TAXATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN FOREIGN MARKETS
FDI Flows to Majority Owned Subsidiaries (MOS): We use the “Total Assets of 
Majority Owned Afﬁ  liates of US Companies” and we calculate its ﬁ  rst difference 
across years in order to ﬁ  nd the ﬂ  ows of capital due to MOS investment. By using 
the appropriate price deﬂ  ator, we derive the real value of MOS that we ﬁ  nally use 
in our regressions. Finally, we normalize the MOS value in the same way as for MIS 
(Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis).
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): The sum of FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS and MIS.
Bilateral Real Exchange Rate: We follow the same derivations as in Goldberg and 
Kolstad [1995]. Speciﬁ  cally, we multiply the nominal exchange rate (deﬁ  ned as the 
price of a US dollar in terms of the currency of the host country) by the price deﬂ  a-
tor of the host country and divide by the respective deﬂ  ator of the US. (Source: IMF 
International Financial Statistics).
Volatility of the real exchange rate: We follow the calculations suggested by Gold-
berg and Campa [1993], and Goldberg and Kolstad [1995]. Speciﬁ  cally, we calculate 
the standard deviation of the real exchange rate for the past 12 quarters and we divide 
it by its mean over the same period. (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
Real GDP: This is the real Gross Domestic Product, or an equivalent, for all the coun-
tries in our sample, and for the period between 1983 through 1993. (Source: OECD).
Consumer Price Index: We use various consumer price indices in calculating our 
real exchange rates. We use the “Consumer Price Index” for Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, US and Spain; 
the “Consumer Price” for Mexico, South Korea, and Sweden. (Source: Datastream 
International Limited). 
 APPENDIX  B
 TABLE  1
 Descriptive  Statistics 
Variable Mean  Minimum  Maximum
FDIijt 12975.578  0.000  398252.632
MOSijt 8638.397  0.000  335521.053
MISijt 4337.180  0.000  290721.053
COTAXit 40.479  16.500  58.000
CATAXit 38.603  0.000  58.000
DITAXit 12.232  0.000  55.000
VEit -0.905  -2.561  0.845
GDPit 6.535  3.248  11.527
Ijt 148.699 6.944  942.328
 TABLE  2
 Correlations 
    FDIijt  MOSijt   MISijt   COTAXit   CATAXit   DITAXit   VEit   GDPit   Iit
FDIijt  1.000         
MOSijt   0.878  1.000        
MISijt   0.761  0.505  1.000       
COTAXit  -0.151  -0.217  -0.013  1.000      
CATAXit   -0.065  -0.205 0.137 0.585 1.000       
DITAXit   -0.151  -0.185 0.021  -0.027 0.041 1.000     
VEit   -0.015 0.003 0.041  -0.341  -0.153 0.649 1.000   
GDPit   0.129 0.028 0.193 0.088 0.475  -0.259  -0.132 1.000 
Ijt   0.489 0.448 0.436 0.033 0.064 0.045 0.078  -0.022  1.00
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 TABLE  3
  Dependent Variable: Total U.S. FDI Flows
 Tax  Responsiveness
Independent  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
Variables Model  Model  Model
VEit -0.533*  -0.268**  -0.0893
 (-3.559)  (-1.929)  (-0.669)
GDPit 0.0667*  0.142*  0.0829*
 (1.972)  (3.844)  (2.556)
Ijt 0.0146*  0.0154*  0.0140*
 (7.775)  (8.253)  (7.978)
COTAXit   -3.0918*
 (-4.533) 
CATAXit   -2.149*
   (-5.267) 
DITAXit       -0.265*
     (-3.705) 
Hausman Coefﬁ  cient  12.93  14.04  18.28
R
2  0.295  0.314  0.303
Sample 381  378  427
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
 TABLE  4
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI Flows to MOS
 Tax  Responsiveness
Independent  Random Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects
Variables Model  Model  Model
Constant 21.525*  16.850*  6.819*
 (7.942)  (10.777)  (18.567)
VEit   -0.538*  -0.239  -0.210
 (-3.246)  (-1.567)  (-1.389)
GDPit 0.0359  0.149*  0.0355
 (1.009)  (3.813)  (0.964)
Ijt 0.01593*  0.0166*  0.0159*
 (10.078)  (10.455)  (9.571)
COTAXit   -4.223* 
 (-5.690) 
CATAXit   -3.133*
   (-6.941)
DITAXit     -0.272*
     (-3.308)
Hausman Coefﬁ  cient  3.23  5.01  2.94
R
2  0.275  0.298  0.244
Sample 381  378  427
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
 TABLE  5
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI Flows to MIS
 Tax  Responsiveness
Independent  Random Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects
Variables Model  Model  Model
Constant 9.322*  5.652* 
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  TABLE 5 - continued
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI Flows to MIS
 Tax  Responsiveness
Independent  Random Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects
Variables Model  Model  Model
VEit -0.169  0.0129  0.241
 (-0.897)  (0.073)  (1.418)
GDPit 0.207*  0.221*  0.185*
 (5.090)  (4.869)  (4.485)
Ijt 0.0158*  0.0161*  0.0156*
 (8.349)  (8.388)  (7.034)
COTAXit -1.415**   
 (-1.673)   
CATAXit   -0.423 
   (-0.812) 
DITAXit     -0.191*
     (-2.096)
Hausman Coefﬁ  cient  13.83  14.46  17.58
R
2  0.236  0.238  0.278 
Sample 381  378  427
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
 TABLE  6
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI Flows
 Interactive  Effects
Independent  Fixed  Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Variables  Effects  Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects
VEit -0.405  0.0003  -0.416*  0.325**  0.131  0.397*
  (-2.705)  (0.001) (-2.793) (1.678) (0.572) (2.0688)
GDPit  0.125*  0.0992* 0.122* 0.173* 0.103* 0.160*
  (3.351)  (2.783)  (3.259) (4.720) (2.898) (4.402)
Ijt  0.0156*  0.0146*  0.0156* 0.0158* 0.0145* 0.0156*
  (8.419)  (7.867)  (8.419) (8.663) (7.805) (8.524)
COTAXit  -0.385  -1.599**     
 (-0.338)  (-1.825)     
CATAXit     0.666 -1.461*   
     (0.574)  (-3.404)   
DITAXit         1.512 1.729*
         (1.275)  (2.711)
COCAit -0.412*   -0.565*     
 (-3.216)    (-2.588)    
CODIit   -0.0776*      -0.502 
   (-2.678)      (-1.633) 
CADIit      -0.104*   -0.589*
       (-4.273)   (-3.487) 
Hausman    14.56  11.79  14.32 13.09 11.54 12.84
 Coefﬁ  cient
R
2
  0.325  0.308  0.326 0.349 0.304 0.340
Sample  378  381  378 378 381 378
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.696 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  7
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI Flows to MOS – Interactive Effects
Independent  Random Random Random Random Random Random
Variables  Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects
Constant 13.669*  15.101*  13.832*  15.0726*  7.263* 7.0941*
 (4.192)  (4.639)  (7.289)  (9.651)  (17.638)  (18.057)
VEit -0.405*  0.196  -0.415*  0.481*  0.322  0.577*
 (-2.462)  (0.730)  (-2.535)  (2.285)  (1.290)  (2.763)
GDPit 0.127*  0.0807*  0.124*  0.185*  0.0842*  0.1680*
 (3.174)  (2.154)  (3.094)  (4.779)  (2.244)  (4.371)
Ijt 0.0168*  0.0161*  0.0168*  0.0171*  0.0160*  0.0169*
 (10.516)  (10.107)  (10.506)  (10.723)  (10.035)  (10.569)
COTAXit 0.12 -2.178*      
 (0.097)  (-2.314)       
CATAXit     0.11  -2.281*   
     (0.088)  (-4.826)   
DITAXit         2.461**  2.909*
         (1.920  (4.132)
COCAit -0.642*    -0.651*     
 (-4.553)    (-2.780)     
CODIit  -0.109*     -0.792* 
   (-3.475)      (-2.384) 
CADIit       -0.130*   -0.943*
       (-4.863)    (-5.055)
Hausman   5.36  2.08  5.08  4.44  2.01  4.5
 Coefﬁ  cient
R
2
 0.313  0.299  0.313  0.340  0.296  0.331
Sample  378 381  378 378  381 378
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
 
 TABLE  8
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI Flows to MIS – Interactive Effects
Independent  Fixed Fixed Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed
Variables  Effects Effects Effects  Effects  Effects  Effects
VEit -0.144  -0.0774  -0.156  0.256  0.0429  0.288
  (-0.739)  (-0.241)  (-0.806) (0.998) (0.145) (1.142)
GDPit  0.156*  0.159*  0.152* 0.184* 0.163* 0.178*
  (3.226)  (3.445)  (3.138) (3.799) (3.541) (3.721)
Ijt  0.0156*  0.0148*  0.0156* 0.0156* 0.0148* 0.0155*
  (6.489)  (6.179)  (6.487) (6.491) (6.145) (6.459)
COTAXit -1.529  -0.901       
 (-1.032)  (-0.795)       
CATAXit     1.873  -0.151  
     (1.241)  (-0.265)   
DITAXit         0.454  -0.165
         (0.296)  (-0.196)
COCAit -0.0044    -0.473**     
 (-0.026)    (-1.667)     
CODIit  -0.0173      -0.154 
   (-0.462)      (-0.387) 
CADIit       0.998    -0.0106
       (-1.566)    (-0.047) 
Hausman    14.10  14.74  13.97 15.40 14.77 15.40
 Coefﬁ  cient
R
2   0.258  0.250  0.259 0.259 0.249 0.259
Sample  378  381 378 378  381  378
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.697 TAXATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN FOREIGN MARKETS
 TABLE  9
  Dependent Variable: U.S. FDI ﬂ  ows to MOS and MIS
  Differences in Tax Responsiveness
Independent  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
Variables Model  Model  Model
DMIS -8.0746*  -9.331*  -1.422*
  (-2.548) (-5.159) (-6.559)
VEit -0.383*  -0.161*  -0.0168
 (-4.0361)  (-1.815)  (-0.185)
GDPit  0.0655* 0.125* 0.0769*
  (2.879) (5.115) (3.360)
Ijt  0.0168* 0.0172* 0.0163*




 -3.562*   




   -2.734* 




     -0.299*




 1.910*   




   2.277* 




     0.162*
     (1.840) 
Hausman Coefﬁ   cient  26.17 23.54 35.94
R
2     0.306 0.330 0.312 
Sample 762  756  854
Notes:  The table reports only the estimations from the most appropriate model among the OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects models.  A (*) next to a coefﬁ  cient indicates its signiﬁ  cance at 0.01 level, and 
a (**) its signiﬁ  cance at 0.05 level.  The reported t-statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity.
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09/03/1999.
3.  “Central Europe: Czechs Backtrack on Incentives – Republic is Bolder in Wooing Investors”, the Wall 
Street Journal Europe, 09/27/1997.
4.  “Ramco Plans to Develop Azerbaijan Field”, the Wall Street Journal Europe, 04/03/1998.
5.  See Appendix A for more on our data sources and transformations
6.  In all estimations, our regressors are in logs.
7.  “Rules Relax for Foreign Involvement in R&D Jobs,” South China Morning Post, 02/17/1998.
8.  Notice though that the effects of FDI inﬂ  ows on the host countries’ R&D activity are still debatable.   
Thus, Feinberg and Majumdar [2001] ﬁ  nd that in the Indian pharmaceutical industry knowledge 
spillovers from multinationals’ local R&D activities do not beneﬁ  t local companies but only other 
multinationals in the same industry.  Also, de la Potterie and Lichtenberg [2001] ﬁ  nd that FDI ﬂ  ows 
transfer technology only in the case where a country invests in a more R&D intensive country but not 
if foreign R&D intensive countries invest in it.       
9.  “Tax Breaks Eyed for Foreign Investment in Capital Area,” the Korea Herald, 09/25/1998.
10.  Some researchers are quite skeptical though about the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI 
inﬂ  ows, especially in developing countries.  Allen et al. [2001] for instance ﬁ  nd that the elimination of 698 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
tax incentives to foreign investors by the Indonesian government was not associated with any decline 
of FDI inﬂ  ows in the country despite the fact that other countries in the region were still offering tax 
incentives to foreign investors.  They also ﬁ  nd that the cost of tax incentives to the Indonesian tax 
payer were far in excess of the beneﬁ  ts of the additional FDI inﬂ  ows, concluding that these programs 
of incentives is simply a transfer of funds from domestic tax payers to foreign investors. 
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